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Articles 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TAX SYSTEM IN 
DETERMINING THE MARGINAL COST OF FUNDS* 
SHAGHIL AHMED 
International Finance Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington, D.C., USA 
DEAN CROUSHORE 
Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pa., USA 
This paper examines the effect on the marginal cost of public funds of two alternative 
ways in which the tax schedule can be altered: one that maintains the progressivity of 
the tax schedule and another that rotates the tax schedule. We calculate values of these 
marginal-cost-of-funds concepts for plausible ranges of key parameters. Our results 
point to the considerable importance of specifying the exact manner in which the tax 
schedule is altered when calculating the marginal cost of public funds. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In evaluating the costs and benefits of public expenditure, the costs are calculated 
using the concept of the marginal cost of funds (MCF). Many recent studies, includ-
ing Wildasin [1984], Browning [1987], and Stuart [1984], have provided numerical 
calculations of the MCF for balanced-budget changes in taxes under a variety of 
assumptions. Stuart's paper is typical of general-equilibrium models in this area in 
that simulation methods are used in calculations of the MCF. More recently, Mayshar 
[1991] has derived analytic expressions for the MCF in a general-equilibrium model 
of the type that Stuart used, in order to isolate which parameters are crucial and which 
parameters wash away. 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not nesessarily reflect those of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any 
other members of its staff. 
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Generally, the literature has considered tax experiments that either assume propor-
tional taxes (so that the marginal and average tax rates are one and the same) or 
maintain the degree of progressivity of the tax system (defined as the ratio of the 
marginal tax rate to the average tax rate).1 The purpose of this note is to show that 
this assumption is crucial. We show the different ways in which the tax schedule can 
affect the MCF. We also provide some new results that have not been noted in the 
previous literature. 
Our general result is that the MCF depends more on how the tax schedule is altered 
than it does on changes in the values of other parameters (such as the initial levels of 
the marginal and average tax rates). This is important because the literature has often 
focused on these other parameters, without discussing how the tax schedule is altered. 
Specifically, we illustrate this point by considering a rotation of the tax schedule (a 
rise in the marginal tax rate without changing the intercept of the tax schedule), as 
an alternative to maintaining progressivity. 
Our main specific result is that if the uncompensated labor-supply elasticity is zero 
and if the tax schedule is rotated as noted above, then our formula shows clearly that 
the MCF must be unity, irrespective of the values of other parameters of the model. We 
consider this result important because previous studies of the MCF have considered 
the situation in which there is a zero uncompensated labor-supply elasticity as a useful 
benchmark case. Therefore, the sensitivity analyses in those studies depend heavily 
on the assumption that the progressivity of the tax system is maintained. 
n. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The government's total tax revenue, R, is given by: 
(1) R=T+mwN 
so that only labor earnings (the product of the wage rate, w, and the labor input, 
N) are taxed, at marginal tax rate m. The parameter T is the lump-sum tax amount 
implicit in the tax system. 2 For example, suppose the tax system is set up with 
some amount of deductions from income (D) and some tax exemptions (E), so that 
R = m(wN - D) - E. Then T = -(mD + E) puts this tax system in the form of 
eq. (1). The average tax rate is t = R/wN. 
We focus on two alternative balanced-budget tax experiments below: 
(I) A change in the marginal tax rate that maintains progressivity, implying that dT 
is whatever is necessary to make d(m/t) = O. 
1 Exceptions are Wildasin [1984] and Browning [1987], who discuss the sensitivity of calculations of 
the MCF to different ways that the tax schedule can be altered. 
2 As our model looks only at the short run in which capital doesn't vary, we can't examine the incidence 
of taxation as in Latham and Naisbitt [1986]. 
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(II) A change in the marginal tax rate that rotates the tax schedule with no change 
in T. 
While some general tax changes may be thought of as maintaining progressivity, 
others may reduce or raise progressivity. For a single-bracket income tax, a combi-
nation of experiments (I) and (II) can provide any potential change in the tax system. 
Tax experiment (I) alone, which has typically been used in this literature, is not suffi-
cient to characterize tax changes like that in the U.S. in 1986, when the marginal tax 
rate was reduced without changing the average tax rate significantly. 
Consider a representative agent who allocates her given total endowment of time 
between leisure (L), and labor (N).3 Her utility function is given by: 
(2) U=U(C,L,G) 
where C is consumption and G is government purchases of goods and services. She 
maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint: 
(3) wN+I+S=C+R 
where I is non-labor income, and S is a lump-sum transfer from the government. The 
agent's virtual income, Z, is the component of her after-tax income that is unaffected 
by her labor-supply choice, so Z = I + S - T. The government must balance its 
budget, so G + S = R. 
If the general-equilibrium response of labor following a tax change is dN, the 
marginal cost of funds is given by: 
(4) dN MCF== I-mw-· 
dR 
As Fullerton [1991] notes, the MCF is the change in welfare, evaluated in con-
sumption units, per dollar of revenue raised.4 
To calculate MCF, we assume that the entire marginal revenue raised from a change 
in the tax rate is spent on government goods and services, so that dR = dG. We also 
make the simplifying assumption shared by the bulk of the literature that G does not 
affect the tradeoff between consumption and leisure.5 
3 The model we use is quite similar to that of Mayshar [1991]. Because the model is one of a representative 
consumer, we can't deal with the marginal cost of funds for redistribution; for an analysis of that, see Ballard 
[1991]. 
4 Because our analysis takes place entirely at the margin, we needn't be concerned with the differences 
between compensating and equivalent variation, as discussed by Pauwels [1986]. 
5 If G affects the leisure-consumption choice, numerical calculations of the MCF may change substan-
tially; see Ahmed and Croushore [1996]. 
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III. FORMULAS FOR THE MARGINAL COST OF FUNDS 
Let MCFM denote the marginal cost of funds when the tax schedule is shifted so as 
to "Maintain" progressivity and MCFR denote it when "Rotating" the schedule. Our 
analytical expressions for the MCF for the two cases are obtained by totally differ-
entiating the first-order conditions of the representative agents' utility maximization 
problem, then solving for dN and substituting the results in eq. (4): 
(5) 
(6) 
ry+ (m -1) ryC 
MCFM=l+--~c!!...-t-~-
1 + ,ry _ (1 + ry) 
m 
MCFR=l+ ry 
1 + ,ryC _ (1 + ry) 
m 
where ry and ryC are, respectively, the uncompensated and compensated labor-supply 
elasticities with respect to the wage rate, and , is minus the elasticity of the wage 
rate with respect to labor.6 
Mayshar [1991] derived a related expression for the MCF that is not restricted to 
particular types of shifts in the tax schedule; however, his MCF is expressed in terms 
of dm/dt. Except in the case where progressivity is maintained (so d(m/t) = 0), his 
formula is less useful than ours because dm/dt is an endogenous variable yet to be 
solved for in Mayshar's formula. Since m = t - T/wN, calculating dm/dt depends 
on general-equilibrium effects on wand N. So dm/dt itself is a function of ry, ryC, 
and other parameters that affect the tax base.7 
III. A. Comparison of MCFM and MCFR 
Our main point can be illustrated by considering eq. (6). When the tax schedule is 
rotated, then a zero uncompensated labor-supply elasticity (ry = 0) implies that the 
MCF is 1, irrespective of the values of the other parameters of the model. This is not 
the case when the tax schedule is shifted up so as to maintain the initial level of 
progressivity. For example, taking Mayshar's illustrative parameter values (which in 
tum are taken from Stuart) of ry = 0, ryC = 0.20, m = 0.427, t = 0.273, a = 0.72, and 
constant returns to scale, which implies, = 1-a, the MCF calculated from eq. (5) is 
6 These formulas differ from those derived by Usher [1984] because we allow taxation to be progressive. 
The marginal cost of funds depends heavily on the labor-supply elasticities in general equilibrium, as 
Georgakopoulos [1991] suggests. 
7 When progressivity is maintained, our eq. (5) is identic.al to Mayshar's eq. (3). 
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MCFM = 1.077, as in Mayshar.8 With a lower marginal tax rate, m = 0.33, and other 
parameters unchanged, the MCFR is still unity, of course, but MCFM drops down to 
1.019. Thus, with 7] = 0, MCFM is sensitive to the initial level of the marginal tax 
rate, while MCFR is not. Also, MCFR becomes closer to MCFM as the tax system 
becomes less progressive. 
The intuition behind the result that MCFR is unity when 7] = 0 is as follows. If 
7] = 0, then keeping fixed virtual income (Z = I -T+S), the substitution and wealth 
effects of a change in the marginal tax rate (m) on labor supply exactly cancel out. 
This means that labor supply will not change, and hence from Fullerton [1991], which 
can also be seen from eq. (4) here, MCF will differ from unity only if virtual income 
changes. If the tax schedule is rotated (so dT = 0), there are no additional wealth 
effects arising from a change in virtual income following the change in taxes. Hence 
there is no effect on the eqUilibrium quantity of labor, so MCF = 1. On the other 
hand, with progressivity maintained, a change in the marginal tax rate necessitates a 
change in T, and hence labor supply, and the MCF is not equal to unity even with 
7] = O. 
There are two important practical implications of our main result. First, the results 
of earlier general-equilibrium studies on sensitivity analysis with respect to how the 
MCF is affected by various parameters (as in Stuart) may depend significantly on 
the manner in which the tax schedule is shifted. Second, the MCF is likely to differ 
substantially for different types of observed tax rate changes, say the 1986 tax reform 
compared to the 1982-83 tax cuts in the United States. 
Note that our argument does not imply that the marginal cost of funds is unrespon-
sive to labor-supply elasticities. The uncompensated and compensated labor-supply 
elasticities are crucial determinants of how much labor supply changes, and hence of 
the MCF, following a tax change. For example, if we consider the alternative values 
of 7] = 0.2 and 7]c = 0.4 (vs. 7] = 0 and 7]c = 0.2 earlier) considered by Stuart, the 
marginal costs of funds are MCFM = 1.303 (vs. 1.077 earlier) and MCFR = 1.142 (vs. 
1.000 earlier). So the MCF remains sensitive to the labor-supply elasticity. But the 
point is that fue degree to which the MCF is affected by changes in any parameters, 
including tax rates, elasticities, and income shares, depends on fue manner in which 
taxes are changed. 
Eqs. (5) and (6) also imply that if we have a progressive tax system (m > t), 
then MCFM > MCFR. This result is also quite intuitive. When fue tax system is 
progressive, a shift in the tax schedule that maintains the initial level of progressivity 
implies that a greater amount of income is subject to distortionary taxation fuan is the 
case if the tax schedule is shifted up proportionately. 
8 Mayshar reports a value of 1.076; the difference between this and our 1.077 is due to rounding. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has developed analytical formulas for the MCF for two types of changes 
in the tax system: a rise in the tax schedule maintaining the initial level of progres-
sivity, which has been standard in most of the literature, and a rotation of the tax 
schedule. The results indicate that the MCF is quite sensitive to the manner in which 
the tax system is changed. In particular, when we consider the same benchmark case 
used by many previous studies in which the uncompensated labor-supply elasticity is 
zero, but rotate the tax schedule, the MCF must be unity because, under these condi-
tions, there are exactly offsetting substitution and wealth effects on labor supply. 
Our results also indicate that the MCF is higher when progressivity is maintained 
than when the tax schedule is rotated. These results point to the considerable impor-
tance of specifying precisely how the tax system is being changed when calculating 
the marginal cost of funds numerically (or investigating its sensitivity to variations 
in other parameters), especially for the purpose of subsequent use by researchers and 
policymakers in benefit-cost analyses. Clearly the marginal cost of funds will differ 
for different types of tax reforms, say the 1986 tax reform compared to the 1982-1983 
tax cuts in the United States. 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix derives eqs. (4), (5), and (6) in the text. 
1. Derivation of eq. (4). 
Since all output (Y) is either consumed (0) or spent by government (G), we have: 
(AI) dO = dY - dG. 
If the production function is Y = peN), then dY = pI dN. Since the wage rate equ~s the marginal 
product of labor, this gives: 
(A2) dY = w dN. 
(Al) and (A2) imply: 
(A3) dC= w dN - dG. 
Now, since a change in labor is offset by a change in leisure, we get: 
(A4) dN = -dL. 
Define the compensating surplus (following Stuart) as the amount of consumption needed to be given 
to the consumer such that the change in utility is zero, so: 
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The first -order conditions of the agent's maximization problem gives the usual marginal utility relation-
ship: 
U2 
- = (l-m)w. 
Ul 
Since the government budget must balance, dR = dG. Using this in (A3) gives: 
dC = w dN - dR. 
From (A5), using (A4), we get: 
CS= U2dN_dC. 
U1 
Using (A6) and (A7) in (A8) gives: 
(A9) CS dN - =l-mw-· 
dR dR 
With MCF defined as CS/dR, this is eq. (4) in the text. 
2. Derivation of eqs. (5) and (6). 
First, use the Slutsky equation, following Mayshar (1991) to get: 
(AlO) (1 - m)(l + 'Yry)dN = -ryN dm - (rye - ry)dZ/w 
where Z = 1+ S - T and'Y = -(dw/w)/(dN/N), so d(wN) = (1 - 'Y)wdN. 
[To derive this, start with the Slutsky equation applied to labor supply: where N = N[w(l - m), Z]; 
the Slutsky equation is rye = ry - w(l - m)N2. Totally differentiating the expression for N gives dN = 
Nld[w(l-m)] +N2dZ; where d[w(l-m)] = (l-m)dw-wdm. Multiplying this expression through by 
w(l-m) and using the definitions of rye and ry gives: w(l-m)dN = ryN(l-m)dw-ryNwdm- (rye _ry) 
N 2 dZ. Now use the definition of'Y to simplify this expression to (AlO).] 
From the production function Y = f(K, N), with capital (K) fixed in the short run, and assuming 
competitive labor markets so that w = fN(K, N), we get dY = wdN. From differentiating the expression 
for total income (Y = wN + 1), dY = d(wN) + dI, so dI = 'YwdN. 
Totally differentiating the expression for virtual income (Z = 1+ S - T), rearranging terms, and using 
dI = 'YwdN gives: 
(All) dZ = 'YW dN - dT. 
Rotating the Tax Schedule 
Differentiating eq. (1) in the text gives dR = dT + m(l - 'Y)wdN + wNdm. Totally differentiating the 
definition of the average tax rate (t = R/wN) gives: 
(AI2) dR = t(l - 'Y)w dN + wN dt. 
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Substituting (AI2) into the total derivative of (1) gives dT = (t - m)(l - 'Y)wdN + wN(dt - dm). When 
the tax schedule rotates, dT = 0, so that: 
(A13) dm - dt = -(m - t)(l - 'Y)/N dN. 
Since dT = 0, (All) simplifies to: 
(A14) dZ = 'Yw dN. 
Solving (A13) for dm, and plugging this and (A14) into (AlO), gives: 
(AI5) 
if 'f/ f. o. If 'f/ = 0, then dN = 0, so MCFR = 1. 
Using (AI5) in (A12) gives dNldR = -'f/lw[l - (1 + 'f/)m + 'f/c'Y)' Using this in eq. (4) in the text 
gives the following result, which is identical to eq. (6): 
(A16) MCFR=l+ m'f/ [1 - (1 + 'f/)m + 'f/c'Y) 
Maintaining Progressivity 
When progressivity is maintained, d(mlt) = 0, so dm = mit dt, and: 
(A17) dm - dt = (T -1) dt. 
Using (AI7) in the expression for dT and plugging this into (All) gives: 
(A18) dZ = ["I + (m - t)(l - 'Y))w dN + (T -1) wN dt. 
Using (A17) and (A18) in (A10) allows ns to solve for dt in terms of dN: 
(AI9) dt = _ 1 - (1 + 'f/)m + (1 - 'Y)'f/t + 'f/cb + (m - t)(l - "I)) dN 
['f/ + (T -1) 'f/c)N 
if'f/ + (mit - l)'f/c f. o. If 'f/ + (mit - l)'f/c = 0, then dN = 0, so MCFM = 1. 
Using (A12) in (A19) gives dNldR = -['f/ + 'f/C(mlt - 1))/[1 - (1 + 'f/)m + 'Y'f/C)w. This can be used 
in eq. (4) to get eq. (5). 
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